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Abstract 
In this article the role of unconventional monetary policy and low interest rates are amplified as 
one of a series of components of possible explanations on US pension funds risk taking and asset 
allocation behavior. We quantify the effects of persistently low interest rates near to the zero low-
er bound, and the unconventional monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve by using coun-
terfactual scenarios and two structural Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) models. We provide the 
first comprehensive evidence showing that monetary policy shocks, identified as changes in in-
terest rates that lead to larger or smaller changes in Treasury yields, are followed by a substantial 
increase in equity assets. The shift from Treasury bonds to equity securities is greater during the 
unconventional monetary policy period. We document a positive correlation between pension 
fund risk taking, low interest rates and the decline in Treasury yields across well-funded and un-
derfunded pension plans, which is consistent with a structural risk shifting incentive.  
JEL classification: G23; E52; G11.  
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1. Introduction 
“More than half of the largest local governments in the U.S. have liabilities from pen-
sion underfunding that exceed 100% of their revenues” (Moody’s Investors Service, Global 
Credit Research, 26 September 2013).  
Over the last decade, underfunded pension obligations have been a credit pressure and 
a key to a broader retirement crisis. The rise in life expectancy, which increases liabilities 
significantly (see also Cocco and Gomes, 2012, for the role of longevity risk on saving and 
retirement decisions), and the immense challenges in the asset allocation landscape, render 
the financing of these liabilities more difficult than ever (Cocco et al., 2005). Official esti-
mates of US public pension fund shortfalls are in the range of $700 billion to $1 trillion, 
while the financial meltdown of 2008 exacerbated the underfunding problem.2 In the after-
math of the last financial crisis, the average ratio of pension assets to liabilities (the funding 
ratio) plummeted from 95% as of fiscal year-end 2007 to 64% by fiscal year-end 2009, and 
recovered modestly to 74% for the 2013 fiscal year.3 However, this recovery in assets is not 
sufficient to cover US pension liabilities. 
The severe funding gap has triggered increased interest among academics, practition-
ers, and policymakers in understanding the investment strategy and risk taking behavior of 
the public pension fund industry. Evidently, US public pension funds have been investing an 
ever-increasing proportion of their assets in risky investments and equities.4 In particular, 
Rauh (2009) finds that private pension plans have departed from traditional investments, such 
as government bonds, and are heavily invested in risky securities, such as equities, and in al-
ternative assets, such as hedge funds, private equities and real estate investment trusts, to 
                                                          
2 This figure is obtained using the calculation and actuarial method of the US Census Bureau.  
3 Please see Appendix B for a detailed presentation of the most underfunded state pension plans. 
4 In the United States, the Public Fund Boards, which govern public pension funds, decides on the allocation of 
assets. To the extent that pension funds are largely unconstrained in the proportion of funds that can be invested 
in risky assets and in their assumptions on the expected rate of return of the various asset classes, they have sig-
nificant latitude to choose their assets and the liability discount rate. 
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achieve higher return. Notably, the author also finds that changes in the allocation of pension 
fund assets seem to be motivated by risk management, rather than risk shifting incentives. 
However, Mohan and Zhang (2014), find that risk shifting incentives dominate in US public 
pension funds asset allocation decisions. The empirical literature on determining optimal as-
set allocation for public pension funds has not settled this issue. For instance Campbell and 
Viceira (2001), and Cochrane (2014) among others, show that investments in stocks can be 
less risky and more profitable for long horizon portfolios, while other studies advocate a 
more conservative approach (e.g., Bader and Gold, 2007). According to Lucas and Zeldes 
(2009) the accounting rules for public pensions create an irregular incentive to invest in equi-
ties since projected liabilities are discounted and calculated on the basis of expectations for 
investment return, instead of discounting them at a rate that reflects the risk of the liabilities. 
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) corroborate on this study to document that pension funds ex-
ploit a loose regulation to camouflage their liabilities by investing in the stock market, which 
results in a higher discount rate being allowed for their liabilities.5 Contrary to Rauh (2009), 
these findings indicate that pension plans asset allocation decisions are dictated by risk shift-
ing, rather than risk management incentives. 
Motivated by the conflicting results reported in the literature, we examine whether the 
new monetary policy era, with low interest rates and the launch of unconventional monetary 
policy is one of a series of components affecting pension funds risk taking and asset alloca-
tion decisions.6 Over the last two decades, the US monetary policy framework has undergone 
dramatic changes. Interest rates decreased near to the zero lower bound to overcome the stock 
market crash of 2001 and the subprime crisis and the financial turmoil of 2008. With single 
                                                          
5 There are typically minimum funding requirements imposed by regulation in the US pension fund industry. In 
particular, the required minimum contributions are calculated on the basis of amortizing existing underfunding 
over a time period of 30 years, while the higher the assumed invested return, the lower the required contribution 
by pension fund members. 
6 Building on Rauh (2009, p. 2689), a risk management incentive is defined “when well-funded pension funds 
invest in more risky securities, while underfunded pension funds invest in less risky assets.” 
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digit inflation and substantial financial downturns, the monetary authorities also launched a 
variety of unconventional measures, including increases in money supply to buy short-term 
government bonds and asset purchases, in response to specific challenges caused by the 
2007–2008 global financial crisis (see, e.g., Adam and Billi, 2007; D’Amico et al., 2012; Ga-
li, 2014; Neely, 2015). These measures, widely known as “quantitative easing”, were subse-
quently adopted by other major central banks such as the Bank of England and the European 
Central Bank and have been found to improve economic and financial conditions (see also for 
relevant discussion and empirical findings in Kapetanios et al., 2012; Joyce et al., 2012; Chen 
et al., 2012; Gambacorta et al., 2014). However, US public pension funds deficits remain stub-
bornly high even though market conditions have improved in the post-crisis period. For instance, 
Franzoni and Marin (2006), argue that the combination of a deep stock market downturn and the 
fall in interest rates from 2000 till 2002 led to a $400billion loss on the funding status of US pen-
sion plans. While there is a “practitioner view” that the new monetary policy era with low in-
terest rates affects pension funds, surprisingly there is no support for this view from empirical 
works. Do low interest rates create an incentive for pension funds to invest their assets in 
risky securities? Is there any effect on pension funds risk taking behavior from the launch of 
the unconventional monetary policy? The influence of monetary policy in favor of risk taking 
in pension funds has been ignored by the literature, which instead emphasizes on endogenous 
factors (e.g., level of underfunding, fiscal and regulatory constraints, and effective risk man-
agement skills) that affect strategic asset allocation decisions (Rauh, 2006; Aglietta et al., 
2012; Blake et al., 2013; inter alia). There are, therefore, several theoretical reasons why 
pension risk might substantially increase, leading to risk shifting instead of risk management 
incentives.  
To assess the impact of unconventional monetary policy and low interest rates on 
pension funds we initially use a regression analysis to identify how asset allocation changes 
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over time, during different interest rate levels and monetary policy regimes. Similar to 
Kapetanios et al. (2012), in order to quantify the role of monetary policy, we define changes 
in the interest rates that lead to larger or smaller changes in bond yields, as monetary policy 
shocks. We employ a Bayesian Vector AutoRegressive (BVAR) model estimated over rolling 
windows to allow for structural changes as well as to consider uncertainty about the probabil-
ity distributions of the system’s variables when analyzing the impulse response functions. 
This model is appropriate because it enables an analysis of complex interrelationships, which 
involves in our case the interconnections between Treasury yields, interest rates, and asset 
and risk management decisions. We use this model to conduct a counterfactual analysis to 
show that Treasury yields would have been higher, ceteris paribus, in the absence of drastic 
changes in the monetary policy framework. This intuition is built on the link between gov-
ernment bond yields and interest rates proposed by Estrella (2005), and is similar in spirit to 
Kapetanios et al. (2012).7 Moreover, we develop a Markov-switching structural VAR (MS-
SVAR) model that relaxes the assumption of constant parameters over time and therefore en-
ables us to incorporate a more sophisticated treatment of potential structural changes across 
different regimes (see also, Waggoner and Zha, 2003; Primiceri, 2005). Motivated by 
Kapetanios et al. (2012), the underlying structural shocks are identified through restrictions 
on the impulse responses. Notably, the use of different models that vary in their emphasis in-
creases the robustness of our findings. 
The results in our study indicate that low interest rates near the zero lower bound, and 
the launch of unconventional monetary policy prompted a gradual increase in equity assets 
and in pension fund risk taking behavior. Additionally, risk shifting incentives to avoid low- 
yield investments (such as Treasury bonds) in favor of more risky investments (such as equi-
ties and alternative assets) dominate pension fund asset allocation decisions. More precisely, 
                                                          
7 Additional information on this approach is provided in Sections 3.2 and 3.5. 
6 
 
in an important departure from prior studies, we separate our sample into different time peri-
ods to capture the effect of monetary policy shocks on pension fund risk-taking behavior. The 
results over the whole sample period initially suggest that asset allocation is correlated with 
short-term lagged investment returns, and higher returns precede higher equity allocation. 
Given that from the 2001 till 2007 the equity market increased considerably, this provides ev-
idence for procyclicality since an increase in the stock market triggers an increase in equity 
holdings. However, the results for the sub-periods uncover the absence of correlation between 
asset allocation and short-term lagged investment returns since 2007–2008. Particularly, the 
slump of the stock market in 2007 – 2008 was not followed by a reduction in equity assets, 
which implies that there is a structural shift out of bond assets. Moreover, the risk manage-
ment incentive is not the primary reason for the reduced allocation to Treasury bond invest-
ments in pension funds. 
If risk management is not the reason that pension funds decrease their investments in 
safe assets and increase their allocations to equities and alternative assets, then what is? We 
find a positive correlation between risk taking and reductions in interest rates that lead to a 
decline in Treasury yields across well-funded and underfunded pension funds, which is con-
sistent with a structural risk shifting incentive. In other words, pension funds risk taking and 
asset allocation behavior is affected by monetary policy shocks. In particular, we uncover that 
a reduction in interest rates which is followed by a decline of 5% in the 10-year Treasury 
yield over the period 1999–2014 is associated with an 18% decrease in the allocation of bond 
securities and a 17% increase in the allocation to equity assets, across well-funded and under-
funded plans. As a result, monetary policy shocks associated with lower interest rates, and 
lower Treasury yields, trigger meaningful changes in asset allocation, in favor of risky in-
vestments.   
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Further results from the counterfactual analysis with the use of the BVAR model sug-
gest that, in a higher interest rate environment without significant declines in Treasury yield, 
the investment return from bond securities would have been significantly larger, from 6.56% 
to 7.19% for a 100 basis point rise in the 10-year Treasury yield and to 7.68% for a 200-
basis-point appreciation in the yield, which is similar to the return for assets allocated to 
bonds. Consistent with Lucas and Zeldes (2009), we find that pension plans assume an unre-
alistically high expected rate of return, which they fail to reach on average. Concretely, the 
mean investment return across the group of pension funds is close to 8%. This is also used as 
the typical liability discount rate. Thus, a high expected return protects future pensioners 
from having to increase their contributions. If risky assets perform well, then the subsequent 
improvement in pension funding reduces the need for increased contributions. Notably, in 
many cases, the assumed higher level of interest rates would have helped many funds to 
achieve their planned return of 8%. Simultaneously, portfolio risk would have been substan-
tially lower. Therefore, the low interest rate environment and the use of unconventional mon-
etary policy prompt a re-allocation of pension fund assets, leading to increased allocations to 
risky investments. The MS-SVAR model generates similar evidence, suggesting that the risk 
taking behavior of pension funds is affected by low interest rates and unconventional mone-
tary policy. In particular, annual investment return increases significantly from 6.56% to 
7.74%. However, conclusions are drawn cautiously as other factors which might have an im-
portant role on pension fund asset allocation decisions are not examined in this study, and 
therefore, monetary policy is one of a series of possible explanations for the risk taking be-
havior of pension plans.   
This article makes an important contribution to our understanding on the determinants 
of pension fund risk taking behavior. We go one step further from the works of Rauh (2009), 
Lucas and Zeldes (2009), and Mohan and Zhang (2014), since it is the first study to explicitly 
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account for exogenous factors that contribute to pension fund risk behavior. Specifically, the 
role of unconventional monetary policy and low interest rates is amplified as one of a series 
of components of pension plans risk taking and asset allocation decisions. Moreover, we con-
tribute to the debate on the dominant role of risk shifting and risk management incentives on 
pension plan asset allocation. Empirical evidence on the dominance of risk shifting in pension 
funds risk taking behavior is particularly thin. Rauh (2009) finds no evidence that pension 
funds, and particularly financially distressed funds, engage in risk shifting behavior. On the 
contrary, the observed correlations between asset allocation and lagged investment returns, 
implies that changes in the allocation of assets are prompted by an incentive for efficient risk 
management. Mohan and Zhang (2014) suggest that public funds undertake more risk when 
underfunded, consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. We extend their works by using a 
comprehensive sample of public pension funds, offering new evidence on the incentives for 
risk shifting in pension funds.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant lit-
erature. Section 3 analyses the research questions and describes the methodology. Section 4 
depicts the dataset and analyses the results. Section 5 presents robustness checks and section 
6 the concluding remark. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Pension fund investment incentives 
Determining optimal asset allocation policy for public pension funds is an important 
but unsettled task. At a theoretical level, Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977) describe a pen-
sion liability as a contract between two parties with a put option exercisable in the event of 
bankruptcy and a strike price equal to the value of pension liabilities. The literature on the 
choice of a portfolio of assets for retirement savings starts with the argument that under spe-
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cific assumptions, the goal of shareholder maximization is achieved when pension funds in-
vest in bonds (see for example Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981; Bodie, 1990; inter alia). These 
studies assume that long-term portfolios for retirement savings refer to conservative inves-
tors, and as a result, they are typically encouraged to hold more bonds, relative to stocks. 
However, several empirical studies observe that on average more than 50% of US pension 
fund assets are invested in stock securities (Rauh, 2009; Mohan and Zang, 2014; inter alia). 
The empirical literature notifies that there are two reasons for this shift in the allocation of as-
sets. 
 First, the portfolio-management landscape has changed radically. While equities have 
traditionally been classified as risky assets, several works provide ample evidence that equi-
ties are actually less volatile when they are measured over long holding periods, and conse-
quently they are relatively safe assets for investors who are able to hold for the long term (see 
also Campbell and Viceira, 2002, Chapter 4). For instance, the existence of volatility shocks, 
and the associated negative correlation of these shocks with excess stock returns, implies that 
long-term investors should hedge volatility risk by reducing their allocation to equity securi-
ties. However, Campbell and Viceira (2001) show that volatility shocks in the US stock mar-
ket is not sufficiently persistent and negatively correlated with stock returns to justify a large 
negative intertemporal hedging portfolio demand for stocks with bond-related assets.  
In a similar vein, more recently, Cochrane (2014) shows that in a dynamic inter-
temporal environment, investments in stocks can be less risky and more profitable for long 
horizon portfolios. In particular, the author proposes dynamic trading based on state variables 
that change over time as a different way of constructing long-horizon portfolios of stocks. In 
addition, several empirical works on long-term portfolio choice provide strong evidence that 
a long term investor with a conservative attitude (i.e. risk averse) should hedge interest rate 
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risk and respond to mean-reverting stock returns by increasing the average allocation to equi-
ty securities (Campbell et al. 2003).  
 A second reason for the shift on the asset allocation to equity securities, rather than 
bonds, is supported by the US regulatory environment. While the financial theory suggests 
that “the discount rate used to value future pension obligations should reflect the riskiness of 
the liabilities” (see also Brown and Wilcox, 2009), in actual practice, pension funds set their 
discount rates based on the characteristics of the assets held in the portfolio, rather than the 
characteristics of the pension liabilities. As a result, Lucas and Zeldes (2009) show that un-
derfunded pension funds prefer to invest heavily in higher yielding, but riskier assets, such as 
equities, because they expect a higher average return to reduce underfunding over time. More 
precisely, the accounting rules for public pension funds set by the Government Accounting 
Standard Board (GASB) create an irregular incentive to invest in equities, since projected lia-
bilities are discounted at the expected return on assets rather than at a rate that reflects the 
risk of liabilities.8 Hence, investing in stocks leads to a higher allowed discount rate for the 
liabilities, and this in turn allows pension funds to present lower degrees of underfunding, to 
camouflage their shortfalls, and helps to postpone any increase for pension contribution to the 
future generations. 
2.2 Risk shifting versus risk management incentive 
As described above, recent developments in the empirical asset allocation literature 
and the accounting rules set for pension funds provide two arguments for the practice of in-
vesting in equity securities in long horizon portfolios. Notably, this practice is largely in par-
allel with private sector practices. Blake et al. (2013) document that over the last two decades 
there is a shift from centralized to decentralized pension fund management, since funds re-
place managers with “better-performing” specialists. However, in most cases, pension plans 
                                                          
8The Government Accounting Standard Board (GASB) is an independent organization that establishes standards 
of accounting for public (state and local) pension funds. 
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are severely underfunded and their investments underperform. Munnell et al. (2008), report 
that the increased exposure to equity securities, from an average of about 40 percent in the 
early 1990s to about 70 percent in 2000s, and the slump of the stock market in 2008 led to a 
loss of about $1trillion dollars. In spite of the new developments in the literature, there is still 
much disagreement across empirical studies.9 Bader and Gold (2007) propose a more con-
servative approach by investing to bonds, to reduce the volatility of funding levels and the 
likelihood of severe shortfalls during financial slumps. In a similar vein, Brown and Wilcox 
(2009) suggest that pension funds should use risk-free real interest rates to discount their pen-
sion promises, and hence should direct an increased proportion of investment to bond related 
securities. Ebrahim et al. (2014) argue that the asset allocation puzzle is purely a partial equi-
librium phenomenon, feasible only in the absence of capital constraints. Therefore, risk-
aversion attitude (such as investments in bond yields) allows for wealth smoothing.  
 Rauh (2009) raises an additional critical issue for pension funds. Are these changes 
and the shift in the risk-taking behavior of pension funds dominated by risk management or 
by risk shifting incentives? In particular, a risk management incentive suggests that well-
funded pension funds could invest in more risky securities (such as equities), while on the 
contrary, underfunded pension funds would invest in less risky assets (such as bonds). The 
author finds that the risk taking behavior of US pension plans is consistent with a risk man-
agement incentive. Mohan and Zang (2014), build on this work to test the risk management 
hypothesis, and they document that, contrary to the findings of Rauh (2009), public funds un-
dertake more risk when they are underfunded, indicating that the risk shifting incentive dom-
inates on US pension plans risk-taking behavior.  
 
                                                          
9 For an in-depth analysis and observation on this issue, see also Benzoni et al. (2007).  
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3. Methodological framework 
3.1 Research questions development 
Blake et al. (2013), and Munnell et al. (2008) among others, find that pension funds 
have increased their investment exposures to equity securities, from an average of about 40 
percent in the early 1990s to about 60 percent in 2010s. As described in Lucas and Zeldes 
(2009, p. 528) an explanation for the shift in the allocation of assets is that “the accounting 
rules for public pensions create a perverse incentive to invest in stocks.” Moreover, some 
studies in the empirical literature for long horizon portfolio investments advocate this change 
in asset allocation. However, as described in Section 2, determining optimal asset allocation 
for public pension plans is an unsettled task. Some studies contradict the shift to equity secu-
rities, while also some reports argue that the increased exposure to equity assets and the 
slump of the stock market in 2008 led to a loss of about $1trillion dollars. 
Simultaneously, over the last two decades, the monetary policy framework entered a 
new era, where low interest rates became the new norm, since the early 2000s. In addition, 
the Federal Reserve adopted unconventional monetary policy tools as a remedy to the finan-
cial turmoil of 2008. As former Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke (2015) argues, the 
launch of unconventional monetary policy tools, such as the zero lower bound policy, were 
employed to influence interest rates, to improve access to credit for businesses and house-
holds. While a great deal of research has focused on the performance, structure, and asset al-
location of pension funds, and while there is a conventional wisdom that the “new” monetary 
policy framework with low interest rates affects pension funds, surprisingly there is no sup-
port for this view from empirical works. This study examines whether the new monetary pol-
icy era is one of a series of components that affect pension funds risk-taking behavior. More 
concretely, we investigate the following questions: Do low interest rates create an incentive 
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for pension funds to invest their assets in risky securities? Is there any effect on pension funds 
risk-taking behavior from the launch of the unconventional monetary policy?  
Moreover, we go one step further to examine whether the new monetary policy era 
encourages a risk management or a risk shifting behavior in pension funds. As proposed by 
Rauh (2009), a risk management incentive suggests that asset allocation decisions are a func-
tion of the funding status, such that underfunded plans invest in less risky securities, while 
well-funded plans invest in more risky assets, such as equity assets. The author shows that the 
risk management incentive dominates in the US private pension funds. On the contrary, Mo-
han and Zang (2014), find that the risk shifting incentive dominates in the US public pension 
funds. These contradictory arguments prompt us to examine whether changes in the behavior 
of pension funds are driven by risk shifting or risk management incentives. 
To assess these questions we split our sample into four periods: i) Period 1 (1998–
2000) when interest rates were between 4% – 7% and the 10-year US Treasury yield was 
about 7% and, hence, investments in safe assets were attractive; ii) period 2 (2001–2005) 
when stock markets collapsed and interest rates reached historical low levels to promote a 
gradual economic recovery; iii) period 3 (2006–2007) is characterized by improvements in 
economic conditions and significant credit expansion, which caused a moderate increase in 
interest rates; and finally iv) period 4 (2008–2013) corresponds to the reduction of the interest 
rate near the zero lower bound, while also the US Federal Reserve announced a large pro-
gram of asset purchases and other unconventional monetary measures. In order to quantify 
the role of different monetary policy regimes on pension funds risk-taking behavior, we fol-
low Kapetanios et al. (2012) to define that changes in interest rates which lead to larger or 
smaller changes in bond yields, as monetary policy shocks. This intuition is built on the link 
between Treasury bond yields and interest rates proposed by Estrella (2005). In addition, we 
examine several counterfactual scenarios in which monetary policy shocks are less persistent 
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(i.e. interest rates decline modestly, and therefore Treasury yields are higher), to investigate 
the effects on portfolio risk (i.e., beta) and how the allocation of assets to risky investments 
could be affected. 
3.2 The BVAR model 
Vector autoregressive models, as introduced in the pioneering works of Sims (1972, 
1980) represent a standard benchmark for the analysis of dynamic monetary policy experi-
ments. Our study builds on two macroeconometric models to analyze the effects of monetary 
policy shocks on the risk-taking behavior of pension funds. We also conduct a counterfactual 
analysis with respect to monetary policy shocks. More precisely, we simultaneously use a 
Bayesian VAR model estimated over rolling windows where parameters are treated as ran-
dom and a reduced-form MS-SVAR model, in which parameters are allowed to change over 
time. While the former enables us to reduce parameter uncertainty and improve forecast accu-
racy, the latter offers the possibility to capture the potential of regime changes.   
Lenza et al. (2010) and Kapetanios et al. (2012) provide a basic framework for captur-
ing the effects of monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic variables. Motivated by these 
studies, we build a similar BVAR-based model   
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛩0 + 𝛩1𝑌𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝛩𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑒𝑡        (1) 
where 𝑌𝑡 represents a vector of five variables (the pension funds allocation to equities, its al-
location to cash and bonds, its allocation to other assets, pension fund portfolio beta and its 
return on investments), 𝛩0 is a vector of constants, 𝛩1 to 𝛩𝑝 are parameter matrices, and 𝑒𝑡 is 
the vector white-noise error term.  
We use a univariate AR(1) process with high persistence as our prior for each of the 
variables in the BVAR model.10 Hence, the expected value of the matrix 𝛩1  is 𝐸(𝛩1) =
                                                          
10 We use a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test to obtain the most suitable number of lags. In particular, we let R(a)=0 to represent a 
set of restrictions and ∫(𝛼, 𝛴𝑒) the likelihood function. Then the 𝐿𝑅 = 2[𝑙𝑛 ∫𝛼
𝑢𝑛 , 𝛴𝑒
𝑢𝑛) − 𝑙𝑛 ∫𝛼𝑟𝑒 , 𝛴𝑒
𝑟𝑒)],  becomes 
(𝑅(𝛼𝑢𝑛)′[
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝛼𝑢𝑛
(𝛴𝑒
𝑟𝑒⊗ (𝑋′𝑋)−1)(
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝛼𝑢𝑛
)′]−1(𝑅(𝛼𝑢𝑛)) and we maximize the likelihood function with respect to α subject 
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0.99 × 𝐼. We assume that 𝛩1 is normal conditionally on Σ, with first and second moments 
given by 
𝐸[𝛩1
(𝑖𝑗)
] = {
0.99
0
𝑖𝑓 𝑖=𝑗
𝑖𝑓 𝑖≠𝑗
, 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝛩1
𝑖𝑗] = 𝜑𝜎𝑖
2 ⁄ 𝜎𝑗
2      (2) 
where 𝛩0 contains a diffuse normal prior, 𝛩1
(𝑖𝑗)
 represents the element in position (i,j) in the 
matrix 𝛩1, and the covariances among the coefficients in 𝛩1 are zero. Also, the prior scale 
and the matrix of disturbances have  an inverted Wishart prior as explained in Appendix C so 
that 𝛴~𝑖𝑊(𝑣0, 𝑆0), where 𝑣0 and 𝑆0 are the prior scale and shape parameters, and with the 
expectation of Σ equal to a fixed diagonal residual variance 𝐸(𝛴) = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝜎1
2, … , 𝜎𝑁
2). Our 
BVAR model is similar to Bańbura et al. (2010) and Kapetanios et al. (2012) since it is esti-
mated using rolling windows to account for structural changes in monetary policy. Conse-
quently, the shrinkage parameter φ determines the tightness of the prior which indicates the 
extent to which the data affects the estimates. 
3.3 The MS-SVAR model 
Our sample contains four regimes: (i) relatively high interest rates (and hence, Treas-
ury yields) between 1998 and 2000 (regime 1); (ii) the stock market crash of 2001 (regime 2), 
which led to a dramatic decline in interest rates and in the Treasury yields; (iii) the 2007 to 
2008 period, in which the federal funds target rate increased modestly and Treasury yields 
followed with a modest increase (regime 3); and (iv) the period from mid-2008 until the end 
of our sample period in 2013 (regime 4), in which the Federal Reserve decreased interest 
rates near to the zero lower bound (and Treasury yields collapsed) and introduced unconven-
tional monetary measures (i.e., quantitative easing) to promote financial stability and eco-
nomic development in the US. This pattern of frequent changes in the US monetary policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to R(α)=0. We test a VAR (?̂? − 1) against VAR (?̂?) and then a VAR (?̂? − 2) against VAR (?̂? − 1) to obtain the correct 
number of lags. In order to compare the results obtained by LR with other testing procedures we calculate: 𝑇(𝑙𝑛|𝛴𝑒
𝑟𝑒| −
𝑙𝑛|𝛴𝑒
𝑢𝑛|) 𝑥2(𝑣)→
𝐷 , where 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−1
′ , … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑞
′ )′, and 𝑋′ = 𝑋0, … , 𝑋𝑇−1), is a (4×4) matrix (i.e. mq*T) and 𝑣 = 2, which repre-
sents the number of restrictions. 
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over recent years led us to consider a regime switching structural VAR model with the fol-
lowing form: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑍(𝐴)𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡                     (3) 
where  𝑌𝑡 is a vector of endogenous variables, c is a vector of intercepts, 𝑍(𝐴) is a matrix of 
autoregressive coefficients of the lagged value of 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 is a vector of residuals. The re-
duced-form error terms are related to the uncorrelated structural errors 𝜀𝑡 as follows: 
𝜀𝑡 = 𝛣
−1𝑢𝑡                       (4) 
The vector of endogenous variables (𝑌𝑡) includes the following four variables in the 
VAR system: 
𝑌𝑡 = [𝑃𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑡 , 𝑃𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑡,  𝑃𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑡 , 𝑃𝐹𝐴𝐵𝑡,  𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑡  ]                 (5) 
where 𝑃𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑡  represents the pension fund’s allocation to equities, 𝑃𝐹𝐸𝐵𝑡  its allocation to 
cash and bonds, 𝑃𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑡  its allocation to other assets, 𝑃𝐹𝐴𝐵𝑡 its asset beta, and 𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑡  its re-
turn on investments.  
We modify the regime switching structural VAR model in Equation (3) to allow for 
changes in the policymaker’s reaction (i.e., regime changes) and to study how pension funds 
are affected. Thus, we propose an MS-SVAR model with non-recurrent states where transi-
tions are allowed in a sequential manner. Hence, to move from regime 1 to regime 4, the pro-
cess has to consider regime 2 and regime 3. Similarly, transitions to past regimes are not al-
lowed. In particular: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐𝑠 + ∑ 𝐵𝑗,𝑆
𝑘
𝑗=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + 𝐴0,𝑆𝜀𝑡                    (6) 
Following Jin et al. (2006) and Mohan and Zhang (2014), we measure the pension as-
set beta as the weighted average of individual asset betas, i.e., 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
 ∑ 𝑊𝑖 × 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , where 𝑊𝑖 is the weight of each asset class with ∑ 𝑊𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1 , and 𝛽𝑖 is the es-
timated beta of each asset class. We extend the SVAR model in Equation (3) to the case of an 
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MS-SVAR with non-recurrent states to account for the regime-dependent reaction of pension 
funds to changes in monetary policies.11  
As in Chib’s (1998) study, the dates of the regime breaks in the model are unknown 
and they are modeled through the latent state variable 𝑆, which is assumed to follow an M-
state Markov chain process (where M refers to the dates of the regimes) with restricted transi-
tion probabilities, such that: 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝(𝑆𝑡 = 𝑗|𝑆𝑡−1 = 𝑖) 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ
𝑝𝑖𝑗 > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗
𝑝𝑖𝑗 > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝑖 + 1
𝑝𝑀𝑀 = 1
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 0    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
          (7) 
Given the number of policy regime changes as described above, M is equal to 4 and 
the transition matrix is defined as: 
?̃? = (
𝑝11 0    0
1 − 𝑝11 𝑝22    0
0 1 − 𝑝22       𝑝33
   0
   0
       0   
  0    0            1 − 𝑝33 1
) 
Alternative modeling techniques provide different relative weights to the sample and 
prior information. Specifically, unrestricted VARs use information very sparsely in choosing 
the variables, in selecting the correct lag length of the model, and in imposing identification 
restrictions. As a result, unrestricted VAR models may lead to poor forecasting due to overfit-
ting the dataset (see, also, Koop, 2013). Structural and Bayesian methods provide a reliable 
solution for these problems as identified by De Mol et al. (2008) and George et al. (2008). By 
using Bayesian inference, we allow informative priors so that prior knowledge and results can 
be used to inform the current model. We also avoid problems with model identification by 
manipulating prior distributions. Therefore, this is the most suitable technique to employ for 
                                                          
11 Note that transitions between regimes are allowed in a sequential manner, and thus to move from regime 1 to 
regime 4, the process must visit regime 2 and regime 3. Transitions to past regimes are also not allowed and, in 
a similar way to the BVAR model and Equation (5), the vector 𝑌𝑡 contains annual data on pension funds, and 
𝐵𝑗,𝑆 and 𝐴0,𝑆 are regime-dependent autoregressive coefficients and structural shock loading matrices respective-
ly.  
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statistical regions of flat density. Moreover, an important assumption in Bayesian inference is 
that the data are fixed and the parameters are random. Hence, with restricted structural re-
gimes, we do not depart from reality. An additional advantage of the use of structural regimes 
and Bayesian inference is that these models include uncertainty in the probability model, 
yielding more realistic suggestions. Also, our structural models employ prior distributions 
and hence, more information is used along with 95% probability intervals for the posterior 
distributions.  
3.5 Counterfactual scenario 
To produce counterfactual forecasts, we base our analysis on the empirical work of 
Kapetanios et al. (2012) and assume that under a different monetary policy framework, inter-
est rates would have been higher and therefore, the 10-year US Treasury yield would have 
been 100, 120, or 200 basis points higher, for the whole sample period, ceteris paribus. In 
practice, we implement this impact on yields by changing the 10-year US Treasury yield 
spread to identify the effect of the simulations on the risk and asset allocation behavior of 
pension plans. Therefore, the effects of monetary policy are captured solely through lower 
government bond yields. We simulate two scenarios: (i) Monetary policy interventions lower 
interest rates and this in turn causes a downward shift in Treasury yields (i.e. monetary policy 
shocks); and (ii) in contrast to scenario (i) monetary policy does not change over time, mone-
tary policy shocks are not identified, interest rates are higher and hence Treasury yields are 
higher. Notably, scenario (i) mimics the real monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve 
while capturing the effect of unconventional policies and low interest rates on pension fund 
asset allocation decisions. Accordingly, scenario (ii) assumes that interest rates and Treasury 
yields would have been higher and thus we adjust government bond spreads and the over-
night repo rate. To identify the impact of monetary policy shocks, we compare the effect of 
the two scenarios on pension fund performance. 
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In a similar vein, Wright (2012) uses a structural VAR model to provide ample evi-
dence that long-term interest rates and Treasury yields lowered significantly since the federal 
funds rate has been stuck at the zero lower bound. Using a similar model, Christensen and 
Rudebusch (2012) find that government bond yields declined, following announcements by 
the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England to buy long-term debt. Also, Weale and 
Wieladek (2016) use a Bayesian VAR model and document that the announcement of 1% of 
GDP of large-scale purchases of government bonds led to a rise of 0.58% and 0.25% in real 
GDP for the US and the UK, respectively. The counterfactual approach employed in this pa-
per is similar in spirit to Kapetanios et al. (2012) and goes one step further from the existing 
literature because it does not simply quantify the effects of the policy on pension funds, but it 
also examines a “what if” scenario, hypothesizing that interest rates and Treasury yields 
would have been higher in a different monetary policy framework.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Data analysis and descriptive statistics 
We collect detailed information about the characteristics, pension plans, and asset al-
locations for 151 US pension funds from January 1998 to December 2013 from the Public 
Plans Database (PPD) obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. 
The full sample includes 2,416 observations and consists of the historical yearly asset alloca-
tion in various asset classes for each pension fund and the yearly return by asset class from 
1998 to 2013, the latest year for which all data are available. Moreover, we collect, from 
Bloomberg database, yearly data for the 10-year US Treasury yield and the federal funds tar-
get rate (upper bound).12 Our sample includes at least one pension fund from each state, while 
also it contains the largest plans based on their assets. More precisely, Table 1 shows that 
                                                          
12 Please, see, Appendix A for detailed information on the pension funds used in the analysis. 
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there are 224 state pension plans, with 151 included in our sample. In addition, there are 
3,761 local pension plans.13 The total number of assets for all the state and local plans is 
about $3,2 billion, while our sample contains information for about $3,0 billion of assets, 
which is approximately 92% of the total assets invested in the US public pension fund indus-
try. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the federal funds target rate and the 10-year US Treasury 
yield. Throughout the 1998–2013 period the Treasury yield continuously declined from 
6.82% in 2000 to 1.49%. Similarly, the federal funds rate decreased from 6.5% in 2000 to 
0.25% in 2013. 
“Please insert Table 1 about here” 
“Please insert Figure 1 about here” 
Table 2 depicts the summary statistics with information on asset allocation for all 
pension funds during the entire sample period. More precisely, Panel A presents the assump-
tion for annual investment return on a yearly basis as reported by the pension funds. It con-
tains the 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year realized investment returns, and the funding gap ratio, which 
represents assets divided by actual liabilities. Any value which is lower than 1.0 implies that 
assets fall short of liabilities and thus the pension fund is underfunded, while a value higher 
than 1.0 indicates that assets exceed liabilities, and thus the pension fund is overfunded. Pan-
el B provides the asset allocation for the pension funds and the estimated betas (i.e., the sys-
tematic risk) for the overall period for each investment. 
Panel A shows that pension funds assume a high expected rate of return, but, on aver-
age, fail to reach that expectation. Hence, our descriptive summary statistics show that funds 
were, on average, underfunded during the sample period. Specifically, the mean investment 
return assumption (henceforth, the performance benchmark) is 7.86%, while the standard de-
viation for the assumed rate of return is 0.42%, indicating a very small variation in the return 
                                                          
13 Analytical data for the surplus or deficit and for the allocation of assets is available only for the 151 pension 
plans included in our sample, due to restrictions in the availability of the data set. 
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assumption within and across pension funds. This means that, if interest rates are below 5%, 
all investments allocated to government bonds and cash will underperform on an annual ba-
sis. The realized return for pension funds is much lower than the assumed rate of return. We 
provide the results for the average 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year returns and observe that pension 
funds underperform their expectations in each case. Indeed, the average returns are 5.58%, 
5.22%, 5.36%, and 6.87%, respectively. While pension funds in some years achieved returns 
that were higher than their assumed returns, they usually failed to meet their target over long-
er investment periods. 
It is worth noting that, over the 16-year period, the funds suffered several disastrous 
returns compared to the 8% benchmark. For instance, the low level of interest rates drove 
their returns much lower than the performance benchmark, while stock market crashes, which 
occurred in 2001 and in the financial meltdown of 2007–2008, further depressed their in-
vestments in equities. Therefore, our statistics suggest that public pension funds are assuming 
unrealistic investment returns, which leads to underfunding with annual contributions being 
based on the assumption of an 8% annual return on investment. Again, the majority of pen-
sion funds are underfunded. The mean actuarial funding ratio for 1998–2013 is 82.4% with 
half of the observations lying in the range of 70.0%–90.0%. The minimum (19.6%) and the 
maximum (197.3%) ratios suggest a high variability of pension funding status. Furthermore, 
the average actuarial funding ratio declines from 98.9% in 1998 to 70.61% in 2013, suggest-
ing that underfunding worsens over the years, which is consistent with the failure to reach the 
benchmark return. 
“Please insert Table 2 about here” 
Table 3 compares asset allocation and portfolio beta by period. We observe that in-
vestments in equities and alternative assets increase meaningfully over the years. In particu-
lar, the average allocation to equities is 42.5% in period 1, and rises to 45.9% in period 2, 
22 
 
50.0% in period 3, and 59.6% in period 4. This increased allocation to risky assets implies an 
increase in risk-taking behavior by public pension funds.  Accordingly, allocation to govern-
ment bonds declines from 39.1% in period 1 to 22.9% in period 4. Pension funds allocating a 
high percentage to equities are apparently most affected by severe market downturns. More 
importantly, we observe that the funding gap ratio increases over the years at the same level 
as the proportion of equity investments increases, leading to an increased number of under-
funded pension funds from period 1 to period 4. This is more evident in late 2008 and early 
2009, when pension funds with large allocations in stocks were more adversely affected. Eq-
uity allocation peaked in period 4 (2008–2013) when the Federal Reserve launched uncon-
ventional monetary measures and lowered its policy rates close to the zero lower bound, con-
firming that these policies affect pension funds and cause an incentive for riskier investments. 
Figure 2 also presents in detail changes in the allocation of assets from 1998 to 2013. 
“Please insert Figure 2 about here” 
Similarly, portfolio beta follows an upward trend, but increases less than the equity al-
location due to the increased investments in alternative assets. The allocation to short-term 
cash also declines over these time periods, since lower interest rates offer an unattractive al-
ternative to pension funds, which expect a high annual return. Although the average alterna-
tive allocation over the entire period is 1.84%, it increases significantly over the period and 
ranges from 1.83% (period 1) to 6.3% (period 4). In summary, compared to the mean values 
for the entire period, bond and cash allocations are lower, while allocations in equities, alter-
native assets, and real estate assets are higher. Pension funds’ portfolio beta, as of 2013, is 
higher than the sample period average, due to the increase in equity assets and the drop in 
bond assets.  
Moreover, Panel A of Table 3 shows that during period 1 (1998–2000) pension funds, 
on average, invested more in government bonds compared to all other periods. As a result, 
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government bonds represented a higher annual required contribution in pension fund invest-
ments. However, the lowering of policy rates close to zero and the associated decrease in the 
level of interest rates triggered a shift in asset allocations, from government bonds to equities 
and alternative investments. This is evident from the figures for period 2 in Panel B (2001–
2005), period 3 in Panel C (2006–2007) and period 4 in Panel D (2008–2013). Note that av-
erage funding ratios declined over the years, and this is related with low interest rates and the 
unconventional monetary policy. However, conclusions are drawn cautiously as other factors 
which might have an important role on pension fund asset allocation decisions are not exam-
ined in this study, and therefore, monetary policy is one of a series of possible explanations 
for the risk taking behavior of pension plans.   
“Please insert Table 3 about here” 
 Panel A of Table 4 presents the top 15 pension funds by liabilities. The funding cov-
erage ratio ranges from 40% to 99%. The 5-year investment return is lower than the return 
assumption of 8% for all pension funds and ranges from 1.7% to 6.8%, confirming the funds’ 
underperformance. However, while the 10-year return presents an improved picture, only two 
funds achieved a rate of return exceeding the return assumption of 8%. Notably, the majority 
of pension funds allocate more than 50% of their investments to equities and less than 25% to 
bonds. Panel B depicts the funds with the higher coverage ratio. It shows that the 5- and 10-
year returns are substantially higher when compared with the fund performance in Panel A. It 
is also evident that these funds allocate a much lower proportion of their assets to equities 
(32% on average) and a higher proportion to bonds (27%), suggesting that investing in equi-
ties does not imply better long-term performance. 
“Please insert Table 4 about here” 
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4.2 Risk determinants of asset allocation 
 To shed light on the effects of low interest rates and the unconventional monetary pol-
icy on pension funds, we examine the relationship between monetary policy shocks, defined 
as changes in interest rates which lead to larger or smaller changes in Treasury bond yields, 
with: i) the return on pension assets during the fiscal year; and ii) the portfolio’s risk (beta). 
Table 5 shows the regression results using pension fund asset allocation as the dependent var-
iable, during the four different time periods. Specifically, a 10% increase in the investment 
return reduces the percentage of assets allocated to Treasury bonds and to short-term cash by 
2.06% during period 1, and systematic risk increases by 0.42% as a result of the reduction of 
assets allocated to safe investments. By contrast, a 10% increase in the investment return in-
creases the percentage of assets allocated to equities by 4.81%. This in turn increases the sys-
tematic risk of the portfolio by 0.68%. 
We also find that a similar correlation exists during period 2, where a 10% increase in 
the investment return prompts a decrease in assets allocated to safe securities by 3.03%, while 
the percentage of assets invested in equity increases significantly by 6.94%. This relation im-
plies that asset allocation is correlated with short-term lagged investment returns, with higher 
returns preceding higher equity and lower bond allocation. Interestingly, for pension funds 
with weak funding ratios (Panel B), the correlation between asset allocation and short-term 
lagged returns is meaningfully smaller, implying a risk shifting behavior. Notably, in periods 
3 and 4, there is an increase in the proportion of alternative assets. The effect of lagged re-
turns is statistically significant at the 5% level. As a result, the allocation of assets is not cor-
related with short-term lagged investment returns, since higher returns precede lower equity 
and bond allocation. 
Notably, for all four periods, the allocation of assets is correlated with monetary poli-
cy shocks - changes in interest rates which lead to larger or smaller changes in bond yields -
25 
 
since a 1% decline in bond yields leads to higher equity and lower bond allocation, as it is ev-
ident from Panels A and B of Table 5. During period 4, when the Federal Reserve announced 
a large program of asset purchases and at the same time lowered policy rates close to the zero 
lower bound, the effects are greater in magnitude. Specifically, the percentage of assets in-
vested in bonds for a 1% decline in Treasury yields is associated with a 10.52% decrease in 
the percentage of assets allocated to bond securities. The effect of changes in Treasury yields 
is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
“Please insert Table 5 about here" 
Overall, our results are consistent with the patterns shown in Figures 1–2, where a re-
duction in interest rates that was followed by a 5% decline in the 10-year Treasury yield over 
the period is associated with an 18% decrease in the allocation to bond securities and a 17% 
increase in the allocation to equity assets. This is observed for well-funded and underfunded 
pension plans, indicating a structural risk shifting behavior. Consequently, a lower interest 
rate environment and the use of unconventional monetary policy measures prompt pension 
funds to change their strategic asset allocation from safe to riskier investments.   
4.3 Results from the BVAR model 
 We estimate the BVAR model using one lag order and a rolling approach for the en-
tire sample period. Similar to Kapetanios et al. (2012), we assume that the use of unconven-
tional monetary policy tools, from 2008 until 2011, and the sharp drop in interest rates near to 
the zero lower bound may have depressed government bond yields by about 100 basis points. 
To assess the impact of monetary policy shocks on the asset allocation and the risk taking be-
havior of pension funds, we compare actual returns with those of the counterfactual scenario 
(i.e., government bond yields would have been 100 basis points higher than actual yields in 
the absence of monetary policy shocks) and take the difference between the two as our esti-
mate. Moreover, we increase the asset allocation to government bonds and decrease the allo-
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cation to equities to identify the return to pension fund investments. This procedure is also 
used in Lenza et al. (2010) and Kapetanios et al. (2012) when they examine the effects of un-
conventional monetary policy on the macroeconomy, and in Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012) when 
they address the effect of monetary policy shocks on financial markets. We also use two addi-
tional tests by simulating the effects of a 120-basis-point and a 200-basis-point increase in 
government bond yields and short-term overnight rates for cash holdings, while allowing the 
size of adjustment on the yields to vary over the entire sample period. 
 Table 6 reports the estimated effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund in-
vestment return and asset allocation. The mean return results reveal that monetary policy 
shocks substantially decreased the return on bond investments, making bond assets unattrac-
tive. The largest impact occurred in period 4 (2008–2013), when the Federal Reserve 
launched a large program of asset purchases and at the same time reduced the official US 
bank rate to 0.25%. While stock markets underperform, plans do not reduce their equity hold-
ings, indicating that there is a structural risk shifting incentive to riskier securities, such as 
equities and alternative investments, as a result of the policy rate cut-off to the zero lower 
bound. This evidence suggests that the funding status of a given pension plan changes in ac-
cordance with developments in monetary policy. Under this scenario, pension funds tend to 
invest more in equities and less in safe assets, such as government bonds. 
 How persistent are monetary policy shocks? We answer this question by examining 
the sensitivity of pension fund returns under the assumption that government bond yields 
would have been higher if there were no major changes in the Federal Reserve’s policy over 
the sample period. The results, reported in Table 6, indicate that the portfolio return for the 
pension funds increases significantly from 6.56% to 7.19% for a 100-basis-point rise in yield, 
and to 7.68% for a 200-basis-point increase in yield. It is notable that, in many cases (i.e., in 
period 1 and in period 2) the assumed higher level of interest rates helps pension funds to 
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achieve their planned return of 8%. Figure 3 evidences the difference in return under the three 
counterfactual scenarios where the percentage of pension fund assets allocated to equities 
could be lower since investments in safer assets would be more attractive. 
“Please insert Table 6 about here” 
“Please insert Figure 3 about here” 
 In the scenario with higher interest rates, we add the assumption that investments in 
government bonds would be more attractive for pension funds and that they would allocate 
their assets accordingly. For a more meaningful comparison, the allocation to government 
bonds is kept constant at the proportion allocated during period 1. Table 7 presents the effects 
of the monetary policy on pension fund returns under these assumptions. The results indicate 
that the portfolio return would have been higher by 122 basis points, increasing from 6.64% 
to 7.86%, while the portfolio beta (systematic risk) would be substantially lower. 
 “Please insert Table 7 about here” 
4.4 Results from the MS-SVAR model 
 We test for the number of regimes by prior knowledge and carry out robustness 
checks by using the marginal likelihood criterion as introduced by Chib (1998). Figure 4 il-
lustrates the estimated regime pattern for pension asset allocation, while Table 8 identifies 
monetary policy shocks through the changes in the interest rates and the associated change in 
Treasury yields. In particular, Table 8 presents the effects during the four monetary policy re-
gimes: i) during period 1 (1998–2000), when interest rates increase and reach their peak lev-
els for the entire sample period; ii) during period 2 (2001–2005), when interest rates de-
crease; iii) during period 3 (2006–2007), when interest rates increase moderately; and iv) dur-
ing period 4 (2008–2013), when interest rates are set at the zero lower bound and unconven-
tional monetary tools emerge. Similar to Kapetanios et al. (2012), the shocks are identified 
using a sign. A positive monetary policy shock that increases interest rates is expected to 
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trigger an increase in the yield curve. On the other hand, a negative shock is expected to 
cause a compression in the yield curve.  
“Please insert Table 8 about here” 
“Please insert Figure 4 about here” 
Figure 5 shows the impulse response functions to Treasury bonds and equity alloca-
tion following a monetary policy shock. From the figure it is clear that the monetary policy 
regime affects substantially the allocation of assets to equities and bonds. Specifically, the re-
sponse from pension funds was to increase the proportion of equities and to decrease accord-
ingly the proportion of assets allocated to government bonds. This finding suggests that pen-
sion funds risk taking meaningfully increases with a decline in the level of interest rates and 
with the launch of unconventional tools.  
“Please insert Figure 5 about here” 
Additionally, to capture the effects of monetary policy shocks, we follow the scenari-
os studied using the BVAR model, where we assume that government bond yields would 
have been 100, 120, or 200 basis points higher, if there had been no dramatic changes in 
monetary policy. Table 9 describes the effects on pension fund asset allocation and invest-
ment return from these simulations. For a 100-basis-point increase in Treasury yields, the 
maximum impact occurs in period 2 (2001–2005) and period 4 (2008–2013), since during 
these two periods the unconstrained policy rate declines. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 
6, the investment return increases significantly from 6.56% to 7.74% for a 200-basis-point 
rise in yield. Similar to the results of the BVAR model, in many cases, the assumed higher 
level of interest rates helps pension funds to achieve their planned return of 8% (in periods 1 
and 2). Moreover, the MS-SVAR model indicates that, if monetary policy shocks had been 
less persistent, the portfolio risk (i.e., beta) would be smaller and the allocation to bond secu-
rities meaningfully higher. 
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“Please Insert Table 9 about here” 
“Please Insert Figure 6 about here” 
Similarly, we also assume that pension funds would allocate their assets according to 
a scenario in which investments in bond securities would be more attractive and that the allo-
cation to government bonds would stay constant at the proportion allocated during period 1. 
The results obtained under this scenario, reported in Table 10, reveal that the investment re-
turn would have been higher by 122 basis points, changing from 6.70% to 7.92%, while the 
portfolio beta would be substantially lower. 
“Please insert Table 10 about here” 
5. Robustness check 
The main finding of our study is that low interest rates and the launch of unconven-
tional monetary policy (i.e., quantitative easing) trigger a risk shifting behavior for pension 
funds to invest in riskier securities, such as equity assets. The allocation of assets to govern-
ment bonds decreased meaningfully as pension funds invested on assets with higher yield, to 
finance their liabilities. We test the sensitivity of our results by using different scenarios for 
the effect of changes in government bond yields on pension asset allocation, portfolio risk, 
and investment return. In this section, we adopt the Chib (1998) approach and use a particle 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation to test for the number of possible regimes, 
since less than four, or more than four, regime switches in principle can occur. We also allow 
the regime to grow exponentially with time t, creating robust dependence between the state 
variables. 
More precisely, the posterior MCMC approach, with a limit of 5,000 observations is 
used to compute the marginal log-likelihood values with the conditional variance depending 
only on past shocks.14 A high value of the log-likelihood (i.e., a value closer to zero) indicates 
                                                          
14 The marginal likelihood is computed in the Markov-switching models in a similar way to Hamilton and 
Susmel (1994). 
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better fitting. Table 11 presents the results estimated by bridge sampling. The differences be-
tween bridge sampling and Chib’s method are very small. Similarly, the alteration between 
the marginal log-likelihood values increases substantially from regimes 1 to 4, but decreases 
in regime 5 for all the pairs considered, as is evident in Table 11. The increased value in re-
gime 5 implies that the four-regime model fits the data best. 
“Please insert Table 11 about here” 
6. Conclusion 
US public pension funds suffer from severe funding shortfalls, triggered, at least par-
tially, by the stock market crashes experienced in 2007–2008. Evidently, pension plans have 
been investing an ever-increasing proportion of their assets in risky investments. In an im-
portant departure from the existing literature, this study provides new evidence on the role of 
unconventional monetary policy and low interest rate on the US public pension funds. Our 
empirical analysis is based on counterfactual scenarios, a Bayesian VAR model and a Mar-
kov-switching structural VAR model. The latter allows us to analyze the complex relation-
ships between Treasury yields, interest rates, and asset and risk management decisions, while 
relaxing the assumption of constant parameters over time and allowing for a more sophisti-
cated treatment of structural changes in pension fund asset allocation strategy. We find that 
monetary policy shocks, defined as changes in interest rates which lead to larger or smaller 
changes in Treasury yields, are followed by an increase in equity assets and a decline in as-
sets invested in bonds.  
Particularly, a decrease in interest rates which is followed by a decline of 5% in the 
10-year Treasury yield over the study period decreases the allocation to bond securities by 
18% but increases the allocation to equity assets by 17%. The greater impact occurs during 
the unconventional monetary policy period with the launch of quantitative easing and the ze-
ro lower bound policy. These results imply that a lower interest rate environment and the use 
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of unconventional monetary policy measures prompt pension funds to change their strategic 
asset allocation from safe to riskier investments.  However, conclusions are drawn cautiously 
as other factors which might have an important role on pension fund asset allocation deci-
sions are not examined in this study, and therefore, monetary policy is one of a series of pos-
sible explanations for the risk taking behavior of pension plans.   
Interestingly, we find consistent results on the reaction of pension fund investment re-
turn to monetary policy shocks, whatever the model used. Particularly, the portfolio return in 
pension funds increases significantly from 6.56% to 7.19% for a 100-basis-point rise and to 
7.68% for a 200-basis-point increase in the yield using the BVAR approach; and from 6.56% 
to 7.74% for a 200-basis-point increase in the yield using the MS-SVAR approach. Notably, 
in many cases the assumed higher level of interest rates helps pension funds achieve their 
benchmark return of 8% (i.e., in period 1 and in period 2). Finally, we document that the risk 
management incentive is not the primary reason for the reduced allocation to Treasury bond 
investments in pension funds. Well-funded and underfunded pension funds invest the biggest 
proportion of their assets in equity securities, indicating that the risk shifting behavior domi-
nates on the US public pension funds risk taking behavior.  
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Appendix A: Data Analysis 
In the US, public sector pensions are offered by three sources: The federal, state and 
local levels of government. Pension plans are divided into two categories namely defined 
benefit and defined contribution pensions. The former has been more widely used over the 
last years by public agencies in the US. Each state administers at least one pension system 
and each system has at least one pension plan. A state government usually establishes multi-
ple pension plans within one pension system for employees with different job qualifications 
and tenure of service. In particular, our dataset contains: i) Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (PERS) plans –also called Employees’ Retirement System (ERS) plans– offered to all 
state police officers, as well as all other qualifying state government employees; ii) the 
Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS) plan, which is offered for employees of state-sponsored 
educational institutions; iii) the State Retirement System (SRS), which is offered to public 
servants, including teachers, municipal workers, and other government employees; iv) plans 
for public safety personnel (PSP); and v) plans for police officers and firefighters. The num-
ber of pension systems in each state ranges from one to six — California and Texas each 
have six pension systems.  
The major data source for the study is the Public Plans Database (PPD) obtained from 
the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College15. The PPD data are collected from 
plans, annual reports, and actuarial valuations. The sample period includes fiscal years from 
1998 to 2013, and covers 151 pension systems from 50 states.  
Table A1. State pension funds used in the sample 
Plan Name Plan Name Plan Name 
Alabama ERS Alabama Teachers Alaska PERS 
Alaska Teachers Arizona Public Safety Personnel Arizona SRS 
Arkansas PERS Arkansas Teachers California PERF 
California Teachers City of Austin ERS Chicago Firefighters 
Colorado School Colorado State Colorado Municipal 
                                                          
15 More information is available from the Centre for Retirement Research at Boston College at: 
http://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database/ 
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Connecticut Teachers Connecticut SERS Contra Tennessee County 
DC Teachers DC Police & Fire Delaware State Employees 
Denver Employees Denver Schools Florida RS 
Georgia County Schools Georgia ERS Georgia Teachers 
Georgia Municipal Hawaii ERS Idaho PERS 
Illinois Municipal Illinois SERS Illinois Teachers 
Indiana PERF Indiana Teachers Iowa PERS 
Kansas PERS Kentucky County Kentucky ERS 
Kentucky Teachers LA County ERS Louisiana SERS 
Louisiana Teachers Maine Local Maryland PERS 
Massachusetts State and Teachers Massachusetts SERS Massachusetts Teachers 
Massachusetts ERF Michigan Public Schools Michigan SERS 
Michigan Municipal Minnesota PERF Minnesota State Employees 
Minnesota Teachers Mississippi PERS Missouri DOT and Highway Patrol 
Missouri Local Missouri PEERS Missouri State Employees 
Missouri Teachers Montana PERS Montana Teachers 
Nebraska Schools Nevada Police Officer  
and Firefighter 
Nevada Regular Employees 
New Hampshire  
Retirement System 
New Jersey PERS New Jersey Police & Fire 
New Jersey Teachers New Jersey PERF New Mexico Teachers 
New Mexico PERF New York City ERS New York Sate Teachers 
North Carolina Local Government North Dakota PERS North Dakota Teachers 
North Carolina State & Local ERS North Carolina State & Local Police 
& Fire 
Ohio PERS 
Ohio Police & Fire Ohio School Employees Ohio Teachers 
Oklahoma PERS Oklahoma Teachers Oregon PERS 
Pennsylvania School Employees Pennsylvania State ERS Phoenix ERS 
Rhode Island ERS REPS Louisiana San Diego County 
San Francisco City & County South Carolina Police South Carolina RS 
South Dakota PERS St. Louis Indiana School Employees St. Paul Indiana Teachers 
Texas County & District Texas ERS Texas LECOS 
Texas Municipal TN Political Subdivisions TN State and Teachers 
University of North Carolina Utah Noncontributory Vermont State Employees 
Vermont Teachers Virginia Retirement System Washington LEOFF Plan 2 
Washington PERS 2/3 Washington School Employees Plan 
2/3 
Washington Teachers Plan 2/3 
West Virginia PERS West Utah Teachers Wisconsin Retirement System 
Wyoming Public Employees Massachusetts State Corrections Of-
ficers Retirement Plan {CORP} 
Connecticut Municipal Employees 
Retirement System {MERS} 
Iowa Municipal Fire and Police Re-
tirement System {MFPRSI} 
Louisiana Municipal Police Em-
ployees Retirement System 
{MPERS} 
Louisiana School Employees Re-
tirement System {LSERS} 
Louisiana State Parochial Employ-
ees Retirement System {PERS} 
Minnesota Public Employees Re-
tirement Association 
{MPERA}[Police and Fire Retire-
ment Fund] 
Oklahoma Police Pension and Re-
tirement System {Police System} 
Utah Public Safety Montana County Employee's Re-
tirement Association {ACERA} 
Wyoming County Employees Re-
tirement Association {KCERA} 
North Carolina City Employees Re-
tirement System {LACERS} 
North Carolina Fire and Police Pen-
sion System {Pensions} 
Montana Water and Power Employ-
ees Retirement Plan {DWP} 
Massachusetts County Employees Massachusetts County Employees Georgia City Employees Retirement 
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Retirement System {ERS} Retirement System {The System} System {SDCERS} 
Georgia Municipal Employees An-
nuity Benefit Fund {"The Plan"} 
Louisiana Police Annuity Benefit 
Fund {"The Fund"} 
Wyoming County Employees An-
nuity Benefit Fund {CEABF} 
Boston Retirement Board Massachusetts Fire Dept Article 1B 
Pension Fund 
Georgia Police Pension Fund Arti-
cle 2 
Georgia Municipal Pension Plan Louisiana Police and Fire Pension 
System 
Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement 
System 
Massachusetts City Employees Re-
tirement System {The System} 
Chicago Teachers South Carolina Municipal Retire-
ment System 
Missouri Fire Employees Retire-
ment System  
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Appendix B. Most underfunded pension funds in the post-credit crisis period 
 
Rank State 
Funding 
ratio 2013 
(%) 
Funding 
ratio 2012 
(%) 
Funding ra-
tio 2011 (%) 
Funding 
ratio 2010 
(%) 
Funding 
ratio 2009 
(%) 
Funding 
ratio 2008 
(%) 
Median funding 
ratio (2008-2013, 
%) 
1 Illinois 39.3 40.4 43.4 45.4 50.6 54.3 44.4 
2 Kentucky 44.2 46.8 50.5 54.3 58.2 63.8 52.4 
3 Connecticut 49.1 49.1 55.1 53.4 61.6 61.6 54.3 
4 Alaska  54.7 59.2 59.5 60.9 75.7 74.1 60.2 
5 Kansas 56.4 59.2 62.2 63.7 58.8 70.8 60.7 
6 New Hampshire 56.7 56.2 57.5 58.7 58.5 68.0 58.0 
7 Mississippi 57.6 57.9 62.1 64.0 67.3 72.8 63.1 
8 Louisiana 58.1 55.9 56.2 55.9 60.0 69.6 57.2 
9 Hawaii 60.0 59.2 59.4 61.4 64.6 68.8 60.7 
10 Massachusetts 60.8 65.3 71.4 68.7 63.8 80.5 67.0 
11 North Dakota 61.0 63.5 68.8 72.1 83.4 87.0 70.5 
12 Rhode Island 61.1 62.1 62.3 61.8 64.3 59.7 62.0 
13 Michigan 61.3 65.0 71.5 78.8 83.6 88.3 75.2 
14 Colorado 61.5 63.2 61.2 66.1 70.0 69.8 64.7 
15 West Virginia 63.2 64.2 58.0 56.0 63.7 67.6 63.5 
16 Pennsylvania 64.0 65.6 71.7 77.8 85.5 86.9 74.7 
17 New Jersey 64.5 67.5 68.1 66.0 71.3 76.0 67.8 
18 Indiana  64.8 61.0 64.7 66.5 72.3 69.8 65.7 
19 Maryland 65.3 64.2 64.5 63.9 64.9 77.7 64.7 
20 South Carolina 65.4 67.9 66.5 68.7 70.1 71.1 68.3 
21 Virginia 65.4 69.5 72.0 79.7 83.5 81.8 75.9 
22 Alabama  66.2 66.9 70.1 73.9 75.1 79.4 72.0 
23 Oklahoma  66.5 64.9 66.7 55.9 57.4 60.7 62.8 
24 New Mexico 66.7 63.1 67.0 72.4 76.2 82.8 69.7 
25 Vermont  69.2 70.2 72.5 74.6 72.8 87.8 72.7 
26 Nevada  69.3 71.0 70.1 70.5 72.4 76.2 70.8 
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27 Ohio 71.9 65.1 67.8 67.2 66.8 86.0 67.5 
28 Montana 73.3 63.9 66.3 70.0 74.3 83.4 71.7 
29 Arizona 74.1 74.5 73.2 77.0 79.9 80.8 75.7 
30 Arkansas 74.5 71.4 72.5 74.8 77.5 87.2 74.6 
31 Minnesota 74.7 75.0 78.4 79.8 77.1 81.4 77.7 
32 Utah 76.5 78.3 82.8 85.7 84.1 100.8 83.4 
33 Missouri 76.6 78.0 81.9 77.0 79.4 82.9 78.7 
34 California 76.9 77.4 78.4 80.7 86.6 87.6 79.5 
35 Wyoming 78.7 79.6 83.0 85.9 88.8 79.3 81.3 
36 Nebraska 79.2 78.2 81.9 83.8 87.9 92.0 82.8 
37 Maine 79.6 79.1 80.2 70.4 72.6 79.7 79.3 
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Appendix C. The Likelihood function 
 
Following Sims (1980), Equation (1) in 3.2 becomes: 
𝑌 = 𝑋𝐴 + 𝐸          (C1) 
and 
𝑦 = (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎 + 𝑒, 𝑒~0, 𝛴𝑒⊗ 𝐼𝑇       (C2) 
where Y and E are (4×4) matrices and X is a (4×1) matrix, 𝑋𝑡 = [𝑦𝑡−1
′ , … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑞
′ , ?̂?𝑡
′); y and e 
are (4×1) vectors, 𝐼𝑚 is the identify matrix, and 𝑎 = 𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝐴) is a (4×1) vector.   
Thus, the likelihood function of Equation (C2) is 
∫(𝑎 , 𝛴𝑒)∞|𝛴𝑒⊗ 𝐼𝑇|
−0.5exp {−0.5(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗ 𝐼𝑇)(𝑦 − 𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎)}(C3) 
where 
(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗ 𝐼𝑇)(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎) = 
(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎) = 
[(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎)]′(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎)] 
and also 
(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎)
= (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 + (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)(𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎) 
where   𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 = (𝛴𝑒
−1⊗𝑋′𝑋)−1(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗𝑋)′𝑦 
Therefore we have 
 (𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗ 𝐼𝑇)(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎) = 
((𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)
′((𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)  (C4) 
+(𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗𝑋′𝑋) (𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎)      (C5) 
We derive the likelihood function of a VAR (q=1) as the product of a Normal density 
for 𝑎, conditional on the OLS estimate (i.e. 𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠) and on 𝛴𝑒, and a Wishart density for 𝛴𝑒
−1, 
conditional on a 𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 from the decomposition of Equation (C4) and Equation (C5) as follows: 
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∫(𝑎 , 𝛴𝑒)∞|𝛴𝑒⊗ 𝐼𝑇|
−0.5exp {−0.5(𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗𝑋′𝑋) (𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎) 
−0.5(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)
′[(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)]} 
= |𝛴𝑒|
−0.5𝑘exp {−0.5(𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗𝑋′𝑋)(𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎)} 
× |𝛴𝑒|
−0.5(𝑇−𝑘)exp {−0.5𝑡𝑟[(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 
−(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)
′[(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)]} 
∞ℕ(𝑎|𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠, 𝛴𝑒 , 𝑋, 𝑦) ×𝕎(𝛴𝑒
−1|𝑦, 𝑋, 𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠, 𝑇 − 𝑘 −𝑚 − 1)    (C6) 
where 𝑡𝑟 is the trace of the scale matrix [(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)
′(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)]
−1. 
The conditional posterior for 𝑎 will be normal and the conditional posterior of 𝛴𝑒
−1 will be 
Wishart. 
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Figure 1. Nominal yields on 10-year Treasury bonds and the federal funds target rate 
Notes: The figure shows nominal yields from 1998 to 2013 on 10-year Treasury bonds for the U.S. and the federal funds target rate set by the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee. The data has been collected from Bloomberg database. 
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Figure 2. The average pension funds asset allocation 
Note: The figure presents the asset allocation of pension funds for the following time-periods: from 1998–2013 (overall sample period), from 1998–2000 (period 1), from 
2001–2006 (period 2), from 2007–2008 (period 3), and from 2009–2013 (period 4). The sample contains 151 pension funds from 50 states.  
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Figure 3. BVAR counterfactual analysis 
Note: The figure shows the persistence of monetary policy shocks on pension funds risk-taking behavior. The actual return refers to the achieved investment return in pension 
assets from 1998 to 2013. Three scenarios are simulated, where the Treasury yield is higher by 100 basis points, 120 basis points, and 200 basis points, respectively, to assess 
the portfolio return. 
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OVERALL PANEL: PROBABILITY OF REGIME 1 
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        SUB-PANEL C        SUB-PANEL D 
 
Figure 4. MS-SVAR switching regimes 
Note: The figure illustrates the four Markov switching regimes, estimated using the MS-SVAR model. The Overall Panel exhibits the whole sample period and shows the 
identification of Regime 1. There are also four Sub-Panels which focus mainly on the period when the Regime is identified. Sub-Panel A shows regime 1 (1998–2000) where 
interest rates increased. Sub-Panel B displays regime 2 (2001–2006) where interest rates declined. Sub-Panel C exhibits regime 3 (2007–2008) where interest rates increased 
moderately. Sub-Panel D reveals regime 4 (2009–2013) where interest rates declined near the Zero Lower Bound. 
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Figure 5. Generalized impulse response functions to monetary policy shocks 
 
 
 
Note: This figure depicts the generalized impulse response functions of the endogenous variables of the MS-
SVAR model during four different monetary policy environments (Regimes 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively). The 
four regimes represent the identification of the shocks (i.e. changes in the interest rates that lead to larger or 
smaller changes to bond yields). The figure summarizes responses by pension funds regarding the allocation of 
assets to government bonds and to equities following monetary policy shocks. The Y axis represents changes in 
the allocation and the X axis represents the time period. During Regime 1, the monetary policy shock causes a 
slight negative response to government bonds and a positive response (i.e. increase in the allocation) in equities. 
During Regime 2, when interest rates decline government bonds respond negatively (i.e. downward slope), 
while equities respond positively. During Regime 3, the monetary policy shock initially causes a negative re-
sponse to the allocation of government bonds (downward slope), but later the response of government bonds re-
covers to higher levels, indicating allocation to bond assets increased slightly, which might be due to the in-
crease in interest rates. On the contrary, the response of equities is initially positive, but later it becomes slightly 
negative. Finally, during Regime 4 (i.e. interest rates at historically low levels) the response of government 
bonds is overly negative, while allocation to equities increases substantially.    
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Figure 6. MS-SVAR counterfactual analysis 
Note: The figure shows the persistence of monetary policy shocks on pension fund risk-taking behavior. The ac-
tual return refers to the achieved investment return in pension assets from 1998 to 2013. Three scenarios are 
simulated, where the Treasury yield is higher by 100 basis points, 120 basis points, and 200 basis points, respec-
tively, to assess the portfolio return. 
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Table 1. Data analysis 
This table presents the total number of state and local pension funds in the US. The number of states that is in-
cluded in our sample is in parenthesis. Also, the table presents total assets for all the pension schemes (i.e. state 
and local) offered from each State, and assets that are included in our sample (i.e. assets in-sample). The total 
number of state pension plans is 224, while 151 are included in our sample. The total number of local pension 
plans is 3,761. Our sample contains the biggest pension plans by assets, and therefore it represents about 92% of 
the total assets of the public (state and local) pension fund industry. The source of this data is from the U.S. 
Cencus Bureau. 
 
State State Local Total Assets Assets in-sample 
1 Alabama 4 (2) 6  $      33,251,180   $      31,688,375  
2 Alaska 4 (2) 2  $      10,406,246   $         9,573,746  
3 Arizona 4 (4) 3  $      41,443,164   $      40,655,744  
4 Arkansas 6 (2) 27  $      22,219,051   $      19,019,508  
5 California 5 (5) 58  $    657,647,900   $    639,233,759  
6 Colorado 2 (2) 65  $      46,530,078   $      42,500,573  
7 Connecticut 6 (3) 55  $      32,522,521   $      29,562,972  
8 Delaware 1 (1) 7  $         8,642,790   $         8,020,509  
9 Florida 1 (1) 471  $    163,785,916   $    138,890,457  
10 Georgia 10 (8) 24  $      82,222,704   $      73,918,211  
11 Hawaii 1 (1) 0  $      12,051,078   $      12,051,078  
12 Idaho 2 (1) 2  $      12,272,952   $      11,413,845  
13 Illinois 6 (5) 650  $    135,110,275   $    119,302,373  
14 Indiana 8 (6) 61  $      28,263,756   $      25,550,435  
15 Iowa 4 (2) 5  $      27,525,334   $      25,075,579  
16 Kansas 1 (1) 7  $      15,918,274   $      14,660,730  
17 Kentucky 6 (3) 15  $      28,043,843   $      25,211,415  
18 Louisiana 14 (8) 21  $      39,936,873   $      34,026,216  
19 Maine 1 (1) 0  $      11,432,765   $      11,432,765  
20 Maryland 2 (1) 17  $      54,432,962   $      49,697,294  
21 Massachusetts 14 (9) 86  $      64,984,732   $      58,746,198  
22 Michigan 6 (5) 130  $      76,494,465   $      67,468,118  
23 Minnesota 8 (4) 137  $      53,136,559   $      44,634,710  
24 Mississippi 4 (2) 0  $      23,017,265   $      21,337,005  
25 Missouri 10 (5) 56  $      58,748,518   $      51,169,959  
26 Montana 9 (4) 0  $         9,060,965   $         7,819,613  
27 Nebraska 5 (3) 8  $      12,748,146   $      11,090,887  
28 Nevada 2 (2) 0  $      29,002,144   $      29,002,144  
29 New Hampshire 2 (1) 2  $         6,450,662   $         5,812,046  
30 New Jersey 7 (4) 3  $      74,449,190   $      66,706,474  
31 New Mexico 5 (2) 0  $      23,139,872   $      19,946,570  
32 New York 2 (2) 6  $    382,206,781   $    358,127,754  
33 North Carolina 6 (6) 2  $      79,986,718   $      77,747,090  
34 North Dakota 2 (2) 9  $         4,074,364   $         3,675,076  
35 Ohio 5 (4) 1  $    159,749,953   $    142,337,208  
36 Oklahoma 6 (3) 6  $      26,611,420   $      21,927,810  
37 Oregon 1 (1) 5  $      59,390,416   $      54,639,183  
38 Pennsylvania 3 (3)   1,577   $      95,888,331   $      80,450,310  
39 Rhode Island 1 (1) 12  $         8,511,634   $         7,583,866  
40 South Carolina 4 (3) 2  $      27,627,880   $      24,837,464  
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41 South Dakota 2 (1) 2  $         9,571,530   $         8,537,805  
42 Tennessee 1 (1) 14  $      45,050,770   $      42,708,130  
43 Texas 7 (7) 125  $    213,473,749   $    192,553,322  
44 Utah 6 (3) 1  $      22,991,422   $      20,048,520  
45 Vermont 3 (2) 2  $         3,613,701   $         2,901,802  
46 Virginia 1 (1) 17  $      70,627,037   $      65,895,026  
47 Washington 6 (6) 20  $      65,919,198   $      61,436,693  
48 West Virginia 1 (1) 40  $      12,330,864   $      11,147,101  
49 Wisconsin 1 (1) 2  $      89,813,290   $      87,388,331  
50 Wyoming 6 (3) 0  $         6,851,026   $         5,713,756  
  
224(151) 3,761  $3,279,182,264   $3,014,875,552  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the 151 US pension funds from 50 states, with 2,416 observations. 
Panel A provides the summary statistics for pension plan return assumption, investment returns and the funding ratio, 
from 1998 to 2013. Panel B provides the summary statistics for the allocation of assets for the whole time period.  
The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College and the Bloomberg database. 
Panel A: Pension funds characteristics. 
 
Mean (%) 
Standard 
deviation 
(%) Minimum (%)  Median (%) Maximum (%) 
Return Assumption     7.86      4.19     5.75      8.00       9.00  
1 Year Inv. Return     5.58      12.04  – 30.70      8.84       31.65  
3 Years Inv. Return     5.22      6.27  – 13.70      5.21       17.90  
5 Years Inv. Return     5.36      3.61  – 3.54      4.20       25.66  
10 Years Inv. Return     6.87      2.54  – 1.47     7.20       13.90  
Funding Gap Ratio     82.44     19.62      19.10      82.50     197.39  
      Panel B: Pension asset allocation, average for the overall sample period (1998-2013) 
 
 Mean (%) 
 Standard 
deviation 
(%)  Minimum (%)  Median (%)  Maximum (%) 
 Equities       53.87       12.27  0.00      56.10         75.40  
 Domestic Equities       36.21       12.42  0.00      38.50         71.57  
 International Equities       16.44       6.39  0.00      16.81        36.04  
 Bonds       27.32       9.70  0.00      26.30         100.00  
 US Govern. Bonds       25.98       11.31  0.00      25.00         100.00  
 International Bonds       2.44       2.41  0.00      0.30         9.90  
 Real Estate       6.07       4.15  0.00      5.96         28.40  
 Cash       2.44       2.99  0.00      0.17         22.50  
 Alternative Invest.       1.84       7.56  0.00      4.40         56.62  
 Pension Asset Beta       57.43       19.38  38.39      50.42         69.88  
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Table 3. Pension fund asset allocation 
This table depicts the detailed asset allocation and the portfolio beta for 151 pension funds from 50 US States, with 2,416 
observations. Panel A provides the allocation from 1998 to 2000. Panel B presents the allocation of assets from 2001 to 
2006. Panel C shows the allocation of assets from 2007 to 2008 and Panel D exhibits the allocation of assets from 2009 
to 2013. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Bos-
ton College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Panel A: Pension asset allocation, Period 1: 1998–2000 
 
 Mean (%)  
  St. deviation 
(%)  
 Minimum 
(%)  Median (%)  Maximum (%) 
 Equities       42.52       9.88  0.00      42.76         57.81  
 Domestic Equities       34.73       6.59  0.00      34.01         94.22  
 International Equities       7.79       3.82  0.00      4.28         19.35  
 Bonds       40.94       9.60  0.00      36.07         100.00  
 US Govern. Bonds       39.10       6.34  0.00      46.87         100.00  
 International Bonds       1.84       1.16  0.00      1.21         3.80  
 Real Estate       3.85       3.61  0.00      3.90         8.74  
 Cash       10.86       5.73  0.00      10.06         30.69  
 Alternative Invest.       1.83       2.04  0.00      1.62         8.77  
 Pension Asset Beta       48.46       10.53 0.00       44.93             56.25 
      Panel B: Pension asset allocation, period 2: 2001–2006 
 
 Mean (%) 
St. deviation 
(%) 
 Minimum 
(%)  Median (%)  Maximum (%) 
 Equities       45.98       11.73  0.00      49.22         60.02  
 Domestic Equities       38.06       8.21  0.00      38.86         91.66  
 International Equities       7.92       5.05  0.00      9.40         25.80  
 Bonds       37.58       10.08  0.00      39.79         98.00  
 US Govern. Bonds       36.23       6.47  0.00      46.35         100.00  
 International Bonds       1.35       1.55  0.00      1.60         5.00  
 Real Estate       5.50       5.74  0.00      8.62         12.08  
 Cash       9.03       5.31  0.00      10.11         24.64  
 Alternative Invest.       1.91       2.26  0.00      1.64         10.93  
 Pension Asset Beta       50.96       12.07 0.00      46.83        60.30 
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Panel C: Pension asset allocation, period 3: 2007–2008 
 
 Mean (%)  
  St. deviation 
(%)  
 Minimum 
(%)  Median (%)  Maximum (%) 
 Equities       50.02       11.98  0.00      52.76         72.40  
 Domestic Equities       32.07       10.36  0.00      40.45         79.82  
 International Equities       17.95       7.02  0.00      20.71         40.83  
 Bonds       33.06       9.98  0.00      30.60         100.00  
 US Govern. Bonds       32.50       5.31  0.00      30.05         100.00  
 International Bonds       0.56       1.07  0.00      0.24         4.00  
 Real Estate       8.45       6.03  0.00      6.29         33.56  
 Cash       6.02       2.21  0.00      6.84         14.77  
 Alternative Invest.       2.45       10.04  0.00      1.66         12.14  
 Pension Asset Beta       54.33       14.82 0.00      48.83        66.71 
 
 
     
Panel D: Pension asset allocation, period 4: 2009–2013 
 
 Mean (%)   
  St. deviation 
(%) 
 Minimum 
(%)  Median (%)  Maximum (%) 
 Equities       59.64       13.88  0.00      58.76         76.50  
 Domestic Equities       36.02       13.52  0.00      38.99         73.79 
 International Equities       23.62       8.93  0.00      23.01         42.87  
 Bonds       24.41       9.25  0.00      21.75         100.00  
 US Govern. Bonds       22.98       10.69           0.00        18.33         100.00  
 International Bonds       2.53       2.63  0.00      0.49         11.02  
 Real Estate       6.92       4.85  0.00      6.54         29.50  
 Cash       2.01       3.91  0.00      0.17         22.50  
 Alternative Invest.       6.35       6.40  0.00      6.12         59.84  
 Pension Asset Beta       68.81       15.39 0.00       49.02         74.09 
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Table 4. Top-fifteen pension funds by liabilities and funding coverage ratio 
This table provides detailed characteristics for the top fifteen pension funds based on their liabilities (Panel A) 
and the fifteen best-funded pension plans (Panel B) as of 2013. In addition, it provides the 5- and the 10-year in-
vestment return, the percentage of assets allocated to equities and bond securities, and the systematic risk for 
each pension plan (i.e. portfolio beta). The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
Panel A: Top-fifteen pension funds by liabilities 
Pension fund 
Liabilities 
(U.S. $) 
Funding 
coverage 
ratio (%) 
Inv. 5 
year re-
turn (%)  
Inv. 10 
year re-
turn (%) 
% of in-
vestment 
in equities 
% of in-
vestment in 
bonds 
Portfolio 
beta 
California Teachers 222,280,992 67.0 3.72 7.53 53.6 16.79 0.57 
Florida RS 154,125,952 85.4 5.04 7.44 59.09 22 0.62 
Texas Teachers 150,666,000 80.8 5.4 7.2 49.7 14.3 0.64 
New York State Teachers 94,538,800 87.5 5.2 7.5 58.89 18.99 0.52 
Ohio Teachers 94,366,696 66.3 4.87 8.08 52.78 20.19 0.61 
Illinois Teachers 93,886,992 40.5 4.2 7.2 43.9 24.79 0.60 
Pennsylvania School Emp. 89,951,816 63.8 2.5 7.72 21.1 18.2 0.62 
Wisconsin Retirement Sys 85,328,704 99.9 1.7 4.8 36.28 14.83 0.58 
Virginia Retirement Sys 79,077,592 65.9 4 7.6 47.49 21.69 0.52 
Georgia Teachers 72,220,864 81.0 6.27 6.55 73.5 26.49 0.56 
Michigan Public Schools 63,839,728 59.5 6.8 7.4 41.79 12.1 0.62 
North Carolina Teachers 
and State Employees 
63,630,280 94.1 5 6.6 46.4 33.79 0.63 
Oregon PERS 60,405,200 90.6 5 8.33 36.9 21.89 0.61 
University of California 57,380,960 75.9 4.67 6.62 47.99 23.99 0.57 
New Jersey Teachers 53,645,476 57.0 5.32 7.26 39.2 15.37 0.61 
 
Panel B: Top-fifteen pension funds by funding coverage ratio 
Pension fund 
Liabilities 
(U.S $) 
Funding 
coverage 
ratio (%) 
Inv. 5 year 
return (%) 
Inv. 10 
year re-
turn (%) 
% of in-
vestment in 
equities 
% of invest-
ment in 
bonds 
Portfolio 
beta 
Washington LEOFF Plan 2 6,859,000 114.6 3.81 8.29 37.7 22.62 0.63 
DC Police & Fire 3,644,085 110.09 7.19 6.8 52.99 28 0.65 
Washington Teachers Plan 8,016,000 104.9 3.81 8.29 37.7 22.62 0.66 
Washington PERS 2/3 23,798,000 102.3 3.81 8.29 37.709 22.62 0.60 
Washington School Em-
ployees Plan 2/3 
3,273,000 101.9 3.81 8.29 37.7 22.62 0.62 
South Dakota PERS 8,803,700 100 7.11 8.72 50.7 19.7 0.64 
Wisconsin Retirement Sys 85,328,704 99.9 4.6 8.39 48.29 21.03 0.63 
North Carolina Local Gov 20,338,784 99.8 5 6.59 46.4 33.79 0.65 
TN Political Subdivisions 7,789,873 94.96 5.33 6.15 56.59 28.49 0.67 
North Carolina Teachers 
and State Employees 
63,630,280 94.19 5 6.59 46.4 33.79 0.69 
TN State and Teachers 34,123,560 93.33 5.33 6.15 56.59 28.49 0.61 
Louisiana State Parochial  3,217,464 92.5 13.65 7.28 37.4 26.71 0.67 
Delaware State Employees 8,257,270 91.1 5.5 9.39 54.1 21.7 0.62 
Oregon PERS 60,405,200 90.69 5 8.33 36.9 21.89 0.68 
DC Teachers 1,759,043 90.09 7.2 6.8 52.99 28 0.67 
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Table 5. Relationship between lagged investment returns and Treasury yields on pension 
fund asset allocation 
This table presents the results of the regression of the change in the percentage of allocation to bond securities, 
short-term cash and equity assets on the mean investment return per period. It also provides the change in the port-
folio’s beta and Treasury yield based on the percentage of changes in the allocation of assets, for 151 US pension 
funds from 50 States resulting in 2,416 observations. Panel A exhibits results for well-funded pension plans. In 
contrast, Panel B presents results for the most underfunded pension plans, from 1998 to 2013. The major data 
source is the Public Plans Database obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the 
Bloomberg database. 
Panel A: Funding status decile 1 (best funding ratio) 
 
Percentage of assets invested in 
bond securities and cash 
 Percentage of assets invested in eq-
uities  
 
Investment 
return (%) 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield (%) 
Investment 
return (%) 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield (%) 
Period 1: 1998–2000 –2.06 0.42 3.67 4.81 0.68 2.89 
Period 2: 2001–2006 –3.03 0.57 6.81 6.94 1.73 7.22 
Period 3: 2007–2008 –5.91 0.85 7.36 –0.87 1.06 6.36 
Period 4: 2009–2013 –8.20 1.36 10.52 –2.39 0.41 7.61 
Probability > x2 0.48 – 0.52 0.59 – 0.53 
Pension funds 151 151 151 151 151 151 
R–squared: Period 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 3 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
R–squared: Period 4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
 
 
Panel B: Funding status decile 2 (worst funding ratio) 
 
Percentage of assets invested in 
bond securities and cash 
 Percentage of assets invested in eq-
uities  
 
Investment 
return (%) 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield (%) 
Investment 
return (%) 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield (%) 
Period 1: 1998–2000 –1.90 0.31 2.04 2.66 0.49 1.80 
Period 2: 2001–2006 –2.03 0.38 3.88 3.92 1.08 3.11 
Period 3: 2007–2008 –2.97 0.40 5.92 1.80 0.53 4.87 
Period 4: 2009–2013 –3.13 0.48 6.96 –0.94 0.21 5.05 
Probability > x2 0.49 – 0.51 0.53 – 0.51 
Pension funds 151 151 151 151 151 151 
R–squared: Period 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 3 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
R–squared: Period 4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
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Table 6. Bayesian VAR counterfactual results  
This table reveals the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset allocation decisions and risk-taking 
behavior. The time periods are split based on the drastic changes in monetary policy to capture the full effects and the 
changes in the characteristics of the pension funds. Three scenarios are simulated: i) 100 basis point increase in the 
Treasury yield; ii) 120 basis point increase in the Treasury yield; and iii) 200 basis point increase in the Treasury 
yield, for 151 US pension funds from 50 States, making 2,416 observations. The major data sources are the Public 
Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Overall sample period (1998–2013) 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean  3.62 1.44 6.56 0.55 
100bp 4.48 2.16 7.19 0.52 
120bp 4.97 2.28 7.25 0.51 
200bp 5.63 2.51 7.68 0.46 
    
 
Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean  5.03 3.01 7.86 0.49 
100bp 5.92 3.85 8.51 0.45 
120bp 6.06 3.97 8.64 0.44 
200bp 7.01 4.30 9.28 0.40 
    
 
Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean  3.84 1.97 7.12 0.52 
100bp 4.51 2.39 7.70 0.50 
120bp 4.64 2.45 7.83 0.49 
200bp 5.29 2.91 8.33 0.43 
    
 
Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean  2.97 1.29 5.87 0.57 
100bp 4.48 2.16 6.51 0.53 
120bp 4.97 2.28 6.70 0.52 
200bp 5.63 2.51 7.49 0.48 
    
 
Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean 1.96 1.01 5.10 0.61 
100bp 2.73 1.42 5.62 0.55 
120bp 2.88 1.59 5.75 0.54 
200bp 3.46 1.73 6.34 0.50 
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Table 7. Bayesian VAR estimation of portfolio effects with higher allocation of assets for 
bond securities  
This table presents the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset allocation decisions and risk-taking 
behavior, based on the scenario that the allocation of assets in bond securities and short-term cash does not change 
from period 1 to period 4. The mean portfolio return represents 151 US pension funds from 50 States, making 2416 
observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement Re-
search at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Overall sample period (1998–2013). 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean return 3.62 1.44 6.64 0.55 
100bp 4.48 2.16 7.48 0.51 
120bp 4.97 2.28 7.57 0.50 
200bp 5.63 2.51 7.86 0.45 
    
 
Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term Cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean return 5.03 3.01 7.86 0.49 
100bp 5.92 3.85 8.51 0.44 
120bp 6.06 3.97 8.64 0.43 
200bp 7.01 4.30 9.28 0.38 
    
 
Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean return 3.84 1.97 7.53 0.52 
100bp 4.51 2.39 7.91 0.50 
120bp 4.64 2.45 7.94 0.49 
200bp 5.29 2.91 8.52 0.42 
    
 
Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean return 2.97 1.29 5.91 0.57 
100bp 4.48 2.16 6.77 0.52 
120bp 4.97 2.28 6.82 0.51 
200bp 5.63 2.51 7.62 0.47 
    
 
Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Actual return 1.96 1.01 5.28 0.61 
100bp 2.73 1.42 5.80 0.54 
120bp 2.88 1.59 5.91 0.53 
200bp 3.46 1.73 6.63 0.49 
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Table 8. Shocks, regimes and effects – MS-SVAR model  
 
Regime/Shock 
Effect on G. 
B yields 
Effect on asset alloca-
tion for G.B 
Effect on allocation 
in equities/Alt. Inv. Effect on portfolio risk 
Peak level for I.R. Positive (>) Positive (>) Negative (<) Positive (lower risk) 
Decrease in I.R. Negative (<) Negative (<) Positive (>) Negative (higher risk) 
Moderate increase 
in I.R. 
Slightly posi-
tive (≥) Positive (>) Slightly negative (≤) Positive (lower risk) 
ZLB and QE Negative (<) Negative (<) Positive (>) Negative (higher risk) 
Note: G.B. denotes government bonds, Alt. Inv. denotes alternative investments, I.R. is the interest rate, ZLB is 
the Zero Lower Bound level for the interest rate, and QE denotes the launch of unconventional monetary policy 
with the Quantitative Easing program.  
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Table 9. MS–SVAR counterfactual results 
 This table exhibits conditional forecasting for the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset allo-
cation decisions and risk-taking behavior. The time periods are divided based on the drastic changes in mone-
tary policy to capture the full effects and the changes in the characteristics of pension funds. Three scenarios are 
simulated: i) 100 basis point increase in the Treasury yield; ii) 120 basis point increase in the Treasury yield; 
and iii) 200 basis point increase in the Treasury yield, for 151 US pension funds from 50 States, making 2416 
observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement 
Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Overall sample period. 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 3.62 1.44 6.56 
100bp 4.51 2.19 7.23 
120bp 4.98 2.28 7.29 
200bp 5.72 2.59 7.74 
    Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 5.03 3.01 7.86 
100bp 5.98 3.87 8.54 
120bp 6.11 3.99 8.67 
200bp 7.16 4.38 9.35 
    Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 3.84 1.97 7.12 
100bp 4.63 2.48 7.89 
120bp 4.69 2.51 7.92 
200bp 5.40 3.01 8.55 
    Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 2.97 1.29 5.87 
100bp 4.53 2.18 6.54 
120bp 4.98 2.28 6.72 
200bp 5.72 2.59 7.60 
    Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Actual return 1.96 1.01 5.10 
100bp 2.79 1.44 5.68 
120bp 2.90 1.61 5.77 
200bp 3.55 1.76 6.48 
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Table 10. MS-SVAR estimation of portfolio effects with higher allocation of assets for 
bond securities 
This table presents the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset allocation decisions and risk-
taking behavior based on the scenario that the allocation of assets in bond securities and short-term cash does not 
change from period 1 to period 4. The mean portfolio return represents 151 US pension funds from 50 States, 
making 2,416 observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Overall sample period. 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 3.62 1.44 6.70 
100bp 4.51 2.19 7.53 
120bp 4.98 2.28 7.59 
200bp 5.72 2.59 7.92 
    Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 5.03 3.01 7.86 
100bp 5.98 3.87 8.54 
120bp 6.11 3.99 8.67 
200bp 7.16 4.38 9.35 
    Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 3.84 1.97 7.58 
100bp 4.63 2.48 7.94 
120bp 4.69 2.51 7.97 
200bp 5.40 3.01 8.61 
    Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 2.97 1.29 5.95 
100bp 4.53 2.18 6.79 
120bp 4.98 2.28 6.83 
200bp 5.72 2.59 7.84 
    Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Actual return 1.96 1.01 5.33 
100bp 2.79 1.44 5.84 
120bp 2.90 1.61 5.92 
200bp 3.55 1.76 6.68 
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Table 11. Marginal log-likelihood for 5.000 simulations 
This table displays results for bridge sampling and Chib’s method for the marginal likelihood value for bridge 
sampling and Chib’s method. The shortest distance from zero indicates the most appropriate the number of re-
gimes. The most suitable number of regimes appears in bold. The sample period is from 1998 to 2013 and con-
tains a total of 2416 observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Cen-
ter for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Filtered probability of regimes 1 2 3 4 5 
Overall sample      
Bridge sampling –853.82 –844.76 –833.09 –822.23 –829.70 
Chib –849.21 –841.04 –831.71 –820.85 –830.63 
Period 1      
Bridge sampling –938.03 –930.60 –920.33 –909.75 –921.44 
Chib –936.42 –931.93 –921.15 –910.06 –919.10 
Period 2      
Bridge sampling –855.73 –849.01 –840.19 –829.37 –840.62 
Chib –842.88 –834.26 –824.25 –813.65 –824.77 
Period 3      
Bridge sampling –972.11 –963.08 –953.02 –941.24 –951.94 
Chib –956.07 –947.63 –937.19 –926.16 –935.29 
Period 4      
Bridge sampling –968.79 –960.48 –950.42 –939.92 –948.67 
Chib –951.40 –943.85 –934.16 –923.10 –931.80 
 
 
 
 
 
